We introduce randomized Limited View (LV) adversary codes that provide protection against an adversary that uses their partial view of the channel to construct an adversarial error vector that is added to the channel. For a codeword of length N , the adversary selects a subset of size ρrN of components to "see", and then "adds" an adversarial error vector of weight ρwN to the codeword. Performance of the code is measured by the probability of the decoder failure in recovering the sent message. An (N, q RN , δ)-limited view adversary is a code of rate R that ensures that the success chance of the adversary in making decoder to fail is bounded by δ. Our main motivation to study these codes is providing protection for wireless communication at the physical layer of networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Shannon [19] formalized the study of reliable communication over noisy channels where transmitted symbols are changed according to a known probability distribution. In adversarial channels corruption of transmitted symbols is adversarial: the adversary can corrupt any subset of the symbols as long as the size of the set is bounded. Much less is known about adversarial channels. For example, although it is well known that the information capacity of a binary symmetric channel with crossover probability ρ is 1 − H(ρ), the answer to the same question in the case of binary adversarial channels where the adversary corrupts a ρ fraction of bits in unknown, although it is known that the capacity is much less than 1 − H(ρ). Adversarial channels have received much attention in recent years [12] [13] [8] as they provide a powerful method of modelling communication channels where the channel behaviour is not known or varies over time.
In adversarial channels, one commonly assumes that the sent codeword is known, or even chosen (for example in randomized codes) by the adversary and that the adversary is allowed to corrupt a fraction of the sent symbols. For unique decoding the number of errors must be less than half the minimum distance of the code, and for higher fraction of errors, one needs to make extra assumptions such as a secret key shared by the sender and receiver in private codes [12] , or bound on the computation of the adversary [14] .
In this paper we consider an adversary with unlimited computation and no secret shared key, but assume that the adversary has a limited view of the transmitted codeword and can see only a fraction of the sent codeword and can add errors to a fraction, possibly different, of the codeword. We assume the encoded message is a q-ary vector and the adversarial capability a probability at least 1 − δ. The bulk of research on δ-RMT protocol assumes the adversary reads and modifies the same subset of paths. Studying RMT as a code over adversarial channels enriches the tools and techniques developed in the two area and results in better understanding and constructions for the two.
B. Our Work
We define and formalize randomized (stochastic) limited view adversary codes, with security against a limited view adversary channel described above. We require the decoder to output either the correct message or a symbol ⊥, that shows the decoder failure. Performance of a code is measured by the probability of the decoder outputting ⊥; this is the success probability of the adversary in making the decoder fail. An (N, M, δ)-LV adversary code guarantees that the message can be correctly recovered against a (ρ r , ρ w ) adversary, and the success chance of the adversary is upper-bounded by δ. The information rate of a code of length N with M codewords is R = log |Σ| M N . A good code will have high information rate for high values of ρ r and ρ w .
We construct an (N, M, δ)-LV adversary code that is nonlinear, and uses two building blocks: a message authentication code and a Folded Reed-Solomon (FRS) code. To encode a message m, the sender first chooses N appropriately constructed secret keys, uses the keys to construct N authentication tags for the message using the chosen MAC (See MAC Construction II for details), and appends the tags to the message. The tagged message is then encoded using an FRS code. The i th component of the final codeword which is sent to the receiver consists of the corresponding component of the FRS code and the MAC key. The decoder recovers the correct message in a conceptually two step process: using the list decoding algorithm of the FRS code to construct a list of possible codewords and then applying the MAC verification algorithm to output either the correct message, or ⊥. This basic two step algorithm however results in an exponential cost decoding because the output list of the FRS decoding algorithm can be of exponential size. A previous application of this general approach of using MACs and FRS codes for the construction of 1-round RMT [16] has this shortcoming. The innovation in this paper is to combine the system of linear equations resulting from the algebraic list decoding algorithm [9] of FRS codes, with a set of linear equations resulting from the verification algorithm of a specially constructed MAC, to have a single system of linear equations whose solution gives the correct message with a high probability. The MAC in this construction must be a key efficient MAC that can be used for different length messages and have appropriate verification algorithm suitable for efficient decoding. MAC Construction II satisfies these properties and is of independent interest. The final decoder complexity is polynomial. The code allows the adversary to, depending on the code rate, read up to half of the codeword and adds error on the same coordinate positions..
RMT Construction:
Our construction of LV adversary code can be immediately used to give an optimal 1-round δ-RMT construction (See Section II-B for definitions.) whose parameters match the best known RMT constructions [16] .
LV adversary code view of RMT protocols suggests a new parameter for evaluation of RMT protocols. In particular, a 1-round δ-RMT family is optimal if its transmission rate is O(1). Information rate of an RMT protocol can be defined as the inverse of its transmission rate (See Section II-B). The asymptotic value of the information rate of an RMT protocol when the code length goes to infinity indicates the amount of information that is asymptotically carried by the protocol, and is a differentiating factor for optimal RMT protocols (all with constant transmission rate).
LV adversarial channels and codes open many new directions for research. Finding general bounds and relationship among the information rate R, read and write ratios, ρ r and ρ w respectively, and finding the highest information rate (capacity) of LV adversary codes remain open research questions. Also efficient construction of good codes (higher rate) is an interesting open problem.
C. Related Work
In [17] we introduced deterministic LV adversary codes. Deterministic encoding puts restrictions on ρ r and ρ w that can be overcome by randomized codes. The definition of decoder error in this paper follows the same approach as deterministic codes, but instead of assuming uniform message distribution as in [17] , allows for arbitrary message distribution. In [17] we also showed how to adapt a 1-round RMT protocol in [16] to construct a randomized construction for LV adversary codes. The error probability of the code assumes uniform message distribution and the decoding complexity of the code is exponential. Table I-C summarizes performances of the two constructions. In both constructions ε is a (small) constant that determines the range of N and δ and the alphabet size.
Protection against message manipulation was first considered in [2] and later formalized as message authentication codes in [20] . Message authentication codes require a shared secret key and provide protection against an adversary with unlimited computation that can replace a sent codeword (encoded message) with another one. The security guarantee for these codes is detection of manipulation.
Adversarial tampering by an adversary that does not "see" the encoded message, has been considered in [3] that define Algebraic Manipulation Detection Codes (AMD) . AMD codes do not need a secret key and tampering is only by adding an adversarial noise. The goal of the encoding however is to detect manipulation.
Adversarial channels have been widely studied in the literature [4] , [11] . Our model of adversarial channel has similarity with the model in [13] where binary oblivious channels are introduced. In oblivious channels the adversary sees the codeword, and depending on the level of obliviousness, can use one of the limited number of distributions on the error vectors that are available to them. A γ-oblivious adversary can employ at most 2 1−γ error distributions for corrupting [17] Uniform
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the codewords. In these codes each codeword is associated with one error distribution. By limiting the adversary's reading capability, our limited view adversary also effectively limits the number of distributions that the adversary can use. However each codeword in general has more than one error distributions. Organization.
In Section 2, we give the background for Folded Reed-Solomon code, 1-round δ-RMT codes and message authentication codes. In Section 3, we introduce the randomized limited view adversary code and give new constructions for MAC. In Section 4, we present an efficient construction for randomized limited view adversary code. Section 5 discusses our results, open problems and future works.
II. BACKGROUND
We give an overview of the main building blocks and definitions required in this paper.
A. Folded Reed-Solomon Code
Let the message space be a set M with probability distribution Pr(m), and F q denote the finite field of q elements. The Hamming weight of a vector e ∈ F N q is denoted by wt(e) and is the number of non-zero components of e.
Definition 1: An [N, q RN ] error correcting code C with information rate R, is a set of q RN code vectors C = {c 1 , · · · , c q RN } where c i ∈ F N q . The code has two algorithms: an encoding algorithm Enc : M → C that maps a message from M to a codeword in C that is sent over the channel; and a decoding algorithm Dec : F N q → M ∪ {⊥} that is a deterministic algorithm that takes a vector in F N q and outputs a message in M or Fail, outputting a symbol ⊥. A decoder error occurs if Dec(Enc(m, r)) = m. Let ρ denote the fraction of errors (the number of errors divided by the length of the codeword) that can be corrected by the decoder. Correct decoding is guaranteed if ρ is less than half of the minimum distance of the code, that is ρ ≤ 1−R 2 . Reed-Solomon code has an efficient unique decoding algorithm that can correct at most a fraction ρ = 1−R 2 errors. Definition 2: An (N, k) Reed-Solomon code with block length N (< q) and dimension k over field F q , is a linear code with the encoding and decoding described below. A message block of length k defines a polynomial f (x) of degree at most k − 1 over F q . The codeword corresponding to this message block is the vector obtained by the evaluation of this polynomial
For higher error ratios, one can use list decoding [6] where the decoder outputs a list of possible codewords (messages).
Definition 3:
Let an (N, q RN ) code to be a code with length N and information rate R. A code C is (ρ, L)-list decodable if the number of codewords within distance ρN of any received word is at most L. List decodable codes can potentially correct up to 1−R fraction of errors. This is twice the number of errors that can be corrected by the unique decoding and is called the list decoding capacity of the code.
Construction of good codes with efficient list decoding algorithms is an important research question. An explicit construction of list decodable code that achieves the list decoding capacity ρ = 1 − R − ε is given by Guruswami et al. [9] . The code is called Folded Reed-Solomon codes (FRS codes) and has polynomial time encoding and decoding algorithms.
Definition 4: A u 1 -folded Reed-Solomon code is a code with block length N = n/u 1 over F u1 q with q > n. We represent the message by a polynomial f (x) of degree at most k over F q , The FRS codeword is over F u1 q and each of its components is a
u 1 is called the folding parameter of the FRS code. We denote the encoding algorithm of FRS code by Enc FRS .
There are a number of efficient list decoding algorithms for FRS codes. We will use the linear algebraic FRS decoding algorithm [9] . The algorithm reduces the list decoding problem of the code to solving a set of linear equations. This algorithm, although not the best in terms of the number of corrected errors, but asymptotically achieves the list decoding capacity. The structure of the decoding algorithm of the FRS code makes it possible to combine it with the new MAC verification algorithm to obtain an efficient decoding algorithm for the LV adversary code. The following Theorem gives the decoding capability of linear algebraic FRS code.
Lemma 1: [9] For the Folded Reed-Solomon code of block length N and rate R = k u1N , the following holds for all integers 1 ≤ v ≤ u 1 . Given a received word y ∈ (F u1 q ) N , in O((N u 1 log q) 2 ) time, one can find a basis for a subspace of dimension at most v − 1 that contains all message polynomials f ∈ F q [X] of degree less than k whose FRS encoding agree with y in at least a fraction,
of N codeword positions. The algorithm outputs a list of size at most q v−1 .
Outline of the Algorithm. We include the following overview of the algorithm to be self-contained. For a corrupted word y = c + e with w H (e) ≤ ρN , the decoding algorithm first constructs an interpolation polynomial Q(X, Y 1 , · · · Y v ) which results in the system of linear equation (2) . In this system, B i,j and a i,j are elements of F q , and f 0 · · · f k−1 are the coefficients of a (unknown) message polynomial in the decoded list. The number of decoding variables v, determines the rank of the coefficient matrix which will be at least k − v + 1. This in turn determines the dimension of the solution space and the size of the list which is equal to
For a vector y ∈ F N q and an integer r, B(y, r) denotes the Hamming ball of radius r centred at y.
Definition 5: A Bounded Distance Decoding (BDD) algorithm Dec(y) is a unique decoding algorithm that takes a received word y = (y 1 , · · · , y N ) and outputs m ∈ M if m is the unique message of the codeword(s) that are at distance at most wt(e) from y. The decoder outputs ⊥ otherwise. For deterministic codes, the above definition implies that the decoder outputs m, if Enc(m) is the only codeword in B(y, wt(e)). In randomized codes however, B(y, wt(e)) may contain more than one encoding of m. Using bounded distance decoding, R either outputs a message m or the fail symbol ⊥, that is Dec(y) ∈ {M, ⊥}.
B. Reliable Message Transmission
In a 1-round δ-RMT problem, the sender S and the receiver R are connected by N node disjoint paths. The goal is to enable S to send a message m, drawn from message space M with an arbitrary distribution, to R such that R receives the message reliably. The adversary A has unlimited computational power and in threshold RMT, can corrupt any subset of at most t out of the N paths. The corrupted wires are unknown to S and R. The adversary can eavesdrop, block or modify communication that is sent over the corrupted wires. S uses the encoding algorithm of the RMT protocol to encode the message m into a vector of N elements, where i th element sent over wire i. The transcript may be corrupted by A and is received by R receives a corrupted vector of elements and uses the decoding algorithm of the RMT protocol to output a message m, or ⊥.
Definition 6: An RMT protocol between S and R is 1round δ-reliable message transmission (δ-RMT) protocol if R correctly receives the message m with probability ≥ 1 − δ, and outputs ⊥ with probability ≤ δ. The receiver never outputs an incorrect message:
The transmission efficiency is measured by the transmission rate which is the ratio of the total number of bits transmitted from S to R to the length of the message in bits. Protocols whose transmission rate asymptotically match the lower bounds are called optimal. Optimal 1-round δ−RMT protocols must have transmission rates O(1).
Computational efficiency is measured by the computational complexity of the encoding and the decoding, as a function of N . Efficient scheme needs polynomial (in N ) computation of both encoding and decoding algorithm.
C. Message Authentication Codes
A message authentication code (MAC) is a cryptographic primitive that allows a sender who shares a secret key with the receiver to send an information block over a channel that is tampered by an adversary, enabling the receiver to verify the integrity of the received message. We follow the terminology of [20] and refer to the information block as source state, and to the authenticated message that is sent over the channel as, the message. 
III. MODEL, DEFINITIONS AND BUILDING BLOCKS
We first introduce our model of randomized LV adversarial channel, and define the decoding error for randomized LV adversary codes. We then describe the construction of a new message authentication code with provable security, that is used in the construction of the LV adversary code. Definition 7: A (ρ r , ρ w ) limited view adversary, or a (ρ r , ρ w ) LV adversary for short, has two capabilities: reading and writing. For a codeword of length N , these capabilities are:
A. Limited View Adversary
• Reading: Adversary reads a subset S r of size ρ r N , of the components of the sent codeword c and learns, (c i1 , · · · , c i ρr N ). • Writing: Adversary adds (component wise and over F q ) to the sent codeword, an error vector e with wt(e) = ρ w N , whose non-zero components are on S w . The corrupted components of c in S w are, (y j1 , · · · , y j ρw N ). The adversary is adaptive: that is the adversary chooses each member of S r and S w , using the knowledge of all the components that have been chosen up to that stage.
B. Randomized Limited View Adversary Code
By observing the values {c i1 , · · · , c i ρr N }, the adversary can determine a subset of possible sent codewords (those that match the seen positions). Let C[c i1 , · · · , c i ρr N ] denote the set of codewords that have {c i1 , · · · , c i ρr N } in positions S r = {i 1 , · · · , i ρrN }.
1) Decoding Error: Decoder uses bounded distance decoding with radius ρ w N : for a received vector y, it considers all codewords that are in B(y, ρ w N ) and if it finds encodings of a unique message, it outputs that message; otherwise it outputs ⊥. The error vector e is of weight w H (e) ≤ ρ w N and is chosen by the adversary after reading {c i1 , · · · , c i ρr N }. The adversary finds the failure probability of the decoder for any error vector e, and chooses the "best" error vector; that is the e that results in the highest failure probability of the decoder. Definition 9: An (N, M, δ) randomized LV adversary code with protection against (ρ r , ρ w ) adversary, ensures that the probability of the decoding failure defined as above, is no more than δ.
C. MAC Construction
In the following we first give Construction I for a MAC, and then in Section III-C2 give Construction II which is an equivalent polynomial representation for Construction I. This latter MAC will be used in the construction of the LV adversary code in Section IV-A. Construction I provides an intuitive understanding of Construction II.
Both MACs are 2 q N secure.
1) MAC Construction I:
The MAC is defined over F q N and works for any length message. The source state of the MAC is x = (x 1 , · · · , x l ), x i ∈ F q N , where l is any integer and l > 0. The MAC key is r = (r 1 , · · · , r d , r d+1 ) , r i ∈ F q N , where d is the smallest integer that satisfies d(d+3) 2 ≥ l. The message (encoded source state) of the MAC is (x, tag). The tag generation is given by,
The MAC function consists of three types of terms. For a message symbol x m with index m, one of the two types of terms defined below, will be calculated calculated. The final MAC is the sum of all the calculated terms.
, is independent of message symbols.
For d + 1 ≤ m ≤ l, the algorithm works as follows. 1. Consider the message symbols m d+1 , m d+2 , · · · m l as a sequence; 2. Construct a key sequence using the product of pairs r i and r j of key symbols as follows: start from the smallest i = 1, j = 1; increase j by one from i to d; then increase i by one and repeat to reach the highest values of the two indexes. 3. Find the product of x m and the element of the key sequence constructed above, that corresponds with position m.
It can be seen that for a given pair i and j, m will satisfy m = id + j − i(i−1)
2 . Lemma 2: The probability that a computationally unlimited adversary can forge a message (x , tag ) with x = x, that passes the verification test is no more than 2 q N . We omit the security proof because of space and note that it can be easily derived from the proof of Construction II which is the same construction in polynomial representation.
2) MAC Construction II: MAC II is a different representation of Construction I above and will be used in the construction of efficient randomized LV adversary code. The MAC can be described by a set of equations over F q . The source state of the MAC is a vector of length N over F q ,
The key of the MAC algorithm is a vector of length N d + 3N − 2 over F q where d is the smallest integer that satisfies d(d+3) 2 ≥ , r = [(r 1,0 , · · · , r 1,N −1 ), · · · (r d,0 · · · , r d,N −1 ), (r d+1,0 , · · · , r d+1,3N −3 )] T
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We write the key as a (3N − 2) × (N + 1) matrix:
where R m , m = 1, · · · are (3N −2)×N matrices over F q that, depending on the value of the index m, can take the following forms, and R +1 is a vector of 3N − 2 components.
where m is written as a pair of integers i and j, similar to the description of Construction I, and we have r i,j,k ∈ F q is calculated as r i,j,k = 0≤a1,a2 a1+a2=k r i,a1 r j,a2 for 0 ≤ k ≤ 2N −1.
Finally, R l+1 = [r d+1,0 , · · · , r d+1,3N −3 ] T .
The tag for a source state is a vector of length 3N − 2,
A source state x is encoded to the message (x, t) using the MAC algorithm,
The verification algorithm Ver(r, (x , t )) for a key r calculates MAC(x , r), and compares it with the received t .
Lemma 3: The probability that a computationally unlimited adversary can forge a message (x , t ) with x = x, that passes the verification is no more than 2 q N .
IV. CONSTRUCTION OF LV ADVERSARY CODE
In this section we describe the construction of an LV adversary code that uses the MAC algorithm in Section III-C2 together with an FRS code with appropriately chosen parameters.
A. (N, q N uR , δ) Randomized Limited View Adversary Code
We assume the adversary reads ρN positions and adds errors to the same positions. Let N and R denote the code length and the information rate, respectively. The LV adversary code is over F u q . Assume the sender S wishes to send the message m = (m 0 , · · · , m N uR−1 ), m i ∈ F q , to the receiver.
Randomized LV adversary code:
The LV adversary code is constructed over F u q where u = u 1 + u 2 . The FRS code is over F u1 q and the randomness r i has length u 2 . The parameters of MAC Construction II are chosen as l = uR and d = √ 2u 1 . We have
Encoding Algorithm used by Sender S :
Step 1: Append vector {0} ∈ F N (l−uR) q to message m = (m 0 , · · · , m N uR−1 ), and form the vector x = {m, 0} of length N l.
Step 2: Generate random keys r i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N , for the MAC Construction II. Each key is written as a (3N −2)×(N l+1) matrix,
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Step 3: Use MAC Construction II to generate tags t i = MAC(x, R i ), i = 1, · · · , N .
The FRS code is of dimension k = N l + N (3N − 2) . The message block for the FRS code is,
Step 4: Use the FRS encoding algorithm to encode m FRS to the codeword c FRS = Enc FRS (m FRS ). The i th component of c, the codeword of the limited view adversary code, is obtained by appending the randomness r i to c FRS i , the i th component of the FRS code.
Decoding Algorithm used by Receiver R :
Step 1: Receive a corrupted word y with the i th component y i = (y FRS i ,r i ). Here y FRS i andr i are the i th component of the FRS code and the randomness in corrupted form, respectively.
Step 2: Use the FRS decoding algorithm to decode y FRS and obtain the system of linear equations Eq. 2.
Step 3: Generate N systems of linear equations, each system obtained from the set of linear equations generated from the FRS decoding algorithm and one MAC key r i . The i th system of linear equation is of the form,
The first N l + N (3N − 2) equations in Eq. 4 are generated by the FRS decoding algorithm of Eq. 2: the first N l columns of the matrix of coefficients of these equations form B 0 , and for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , columns (N l + (i − 1)(3N − 2)) to (N l + i(3N − 2) − 1) of the matrix specify B i . Finally, −a is the right hand side vector of Eq. 2. The last 3N − 2 equations are from MAC Construction II using key r i , with R i = [R i,1 | · · · | R i,l ], and I is the identity matrix.
Step 4: Solve each of the N linear equation systems. Let x i denote, the first N l components of an output of the i th system. The i th system of linear equation will output x i , if and only if x i is the unique output of this system. Otherwise the output of the i th system is marked as NULL.
R outputs the first uRN components of that x as m, if at least N − ρN systems of linear equations output a unique x. Otherwise outputs ⊥.
B. Adversary's Reading and Writing Capability
Theorem 1: The above (N, q RN , δ) randomized limited view adversary code over F u q , can correctly decode if the adversary reads and writes on the same set of size ρN of a codeword component.
Proof: Firstly, ρ < 1/2: if the adversary is allowed to read and write on half of the components of a codeword c, they can choose any other codeword c and add appropriate error vector to replace components of c on the controlled positions to obtain y which is equal to c on the controlled components, and equal to c on the remaining ones. The decoder finds two codewords at distance ρN from the received word y and so decode y as fail.
Secondly, we find a bound on ρ when ρ < 1 2 . The code dimension of the FRS code is k = N uR, and each component is in F u q . Note that only the FRS code, which is over F u1 q , contains the message information. Hence, k = N u 1 R 1 . Let R FRS be the information rate of the FRS code. The decoding algorithm of the LV adversary code need to satisfy the decoding conditions of the FRS code. According to Lemma 1, the FRS code with length N and information rate R FRS can decode ρN adversarial errors if the following condition is satisfied:
This is satisfied if,
Simplifying the above gives the maximum error that the adversary can add as,
The LV adversary code is over F u q and u = u 1 + and because u 1 ≤ u, we have,
The decoding condition (6) of FRS code is satisfied if the following inequality holds:
This is equivalent to,
Noting that 2ρN < N and ρN is an integer, we have 2ρN +1 ≤ N , and ρ <= 1/2−1/2N . Combined with the above inequality we have,
C. Decoding Error
The adversary reads ρN components of a corrupted codeword and adds errors to the same positions using the knowledge of the components that are read.
Lemma 4: If the adversary does not choose the i th position for reading and writing, the probability that the i th system of linear equations (Eqs. 4) does not produce a unique solution which contains the correct message m is at most 2 q N −v+1 .That is,
with c FRS = Enc FRS (m FRS ) and m FRS = (x , t 1 · · · t N ) and (x = x). Proof: Firstly, because the correct message is always contained in the decoded list of the FRS decoding algorithm, the correct x = {m, 0} will be in the solution space of the system of linear Eq. 2. Also because the key r i has not been modified, the solution will be contained in the solution space of the equations generated by the MAC. Hence the solution space of the Eqs. 4 must contain the correct message m.
Secondly, we show that a solution x = x of the system of linear Eqs. 2 resulting from the FRS decoding algorithm, will be a solution of the system of linear Eqs. 4 with probability at most 2 q N . Assume x = x is a solution of Eqs. 4. This means that it must satisfy the equations generated by the MAC algorithm:
Using lemma 3, the probability that MAC(x , r i ) = t i is at most 2 q N . Finally, the system of linear equations Eq. 2 generated by the decoding algorithm of the FRS code produces a list of at most q v−1 solutions, {c
each codeword represents a message of the form m FRS = (x , t 1 · · · t N ). The first N l components of each solution gives one solution for x . Using the union bound, the probability that at least one solution x = x of Eqs. 2 is also a solution of Eqs. 7 (hence resulting in more than one solution for the Eqs. 4), is no more than 2q v−1 q N . If the adversary has no information about r i after observing {c i1 , · · · , c iρn }, the probability that {c FRS : d H (c FRS , y FRS ) ≤ ρN } and the message passes the MAC verification MAC(x , r i ) = t i will be no more than
Theorem 2: The decoding error of the (N, q RN , δ) randomized limited view adversary code is at most δ ≤ 2N q N −v+1 . Proof: Let y = Enc(m, r) + e be the corrupted word, and I 3 = S r = S w denote the positions that are read and modified by the adversary. For a codeword c = (c FRS , r 1 , · · · , r N ) with c FRS = Enc FRS (m FRS ) and m FRS = (x , t 1 · · · t N ) and x =
x, let I c 1 = {i : c i = y i } and I c 2 = {i : MAC(x , r i ) = t i }. According to definition 8, the probability of decoding failure for an encoding of a message m that satisfies the observation set (c i1 · · · c i ρN ) is, If we choose v = 1 ε , u = 2 ε 4 + 2N ε 2 where ε > 0 is a small value, the decoding capability ρ can be approximated if ρ = min( 1 2 − 1 2N , 1 − (1 + N ε 2 )R − N ε 4 − N 2 ε 6 ), and the decoding error will be given by δ ≤ q 1 ε −N . The field size q can be chosen as the smallest prime q > N u. The encoding algorithm is polynomial in N . For The computational complexity of solving the i th system of linear equation Eqs. 4 is O(((uN + N 2 ) log q) 2 ) and there are N such systems. So the computational complexity of the decoding algorithm is polynomial in O(N ((uN + N 2 ) log q) 2 ).
Corollary 1: Assume the adversary is allowed to read (at most) ρ fraction of a codeword and write on the same set. The (N, q RN , δ) randomized LV adversary code over F RMT code from LV adversary code. The construction above can be immediately used to construct an optimal 1-round δ-RMT, by using the encoding algorithm of the LV adversary code with appropriate length, to construct a codeword for the message, and simply send the i th component of the codeword on path i in the RMT setting. The decoding error in the LV adversary codes is equivalent to the strongest definition of reliability in RMT scenario where the adversary can choose the message distribution, and so δ in the corresponding RMT will be at most equal to the decoder failure in LV adversary codes. The optimality follows from the constant (non-zero) rate of the LV adversary code. Corollary 2: The construction of the randomized LV adversary code gives an optimal 1-round δ-RMT, where δ is the same as the decoding error in the LV adversary code.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We introduced randomized limited view adversary codes and gave an efficient construction for it. With appropriate choice of parameters, the code can correct close to N/2 errors and will have information rate close to 1/2. There are numerous open problems that follow from this work, some outlined below.
Randomized codes do not have the restrictions of deterministic codes on their parameters and compared to these codes can achieve better performance (higher ρ r and ρ w for fixed R). Finding general bounds and relationship among the information rate R, observation ρ r and corruption ρ w ratios, and finding the information capacity of LV adversary codes remain important research questions.
Although in general the observation and corruption sets in LV adversary codes can be different, in our construction we required them to be the same. Giving a construction without this requirement will be our future work. Also, in our construction the field size is a function of N and so for smaller δ, larger field sizes is required. Finding good LV adversary codes with fixed field size and/or information rate approaching 1 − ρ − ε are open problems.
Our work suggests more refined way of evaluating RMT codes by introducing information rate for these protocols. Extending definition of LV adversary codes to interactive scenarios will be an interesting open question.
